我展示！哈佛商学院首届Labubu Party
我在哈佛搞事情
众所周知，哈佛大学的生活是 —— 学习运动派对 Study Hard, Work Hard, Party Hard（从来都没有睡觉的份儿！）
要在这里Stand Out，确实得拿出一点绝活儿。
因此，这次OPM Unit2，我们华人小群体搞了一个👇
LABUBU Party 🎉🎉🎉荣耀归于所有的party组织者们！👇
Such a team work!
从策划到采购到执行，全部都是同学们自己搞的。关键大家还要起早贪黑的读案例、上课、社交……
为了增加互动性，我们甚至请到了太极师父来教拳～
三周的课，party放在第二周， 第一周都在宣传，光是海报就发了好几版～
结果。。。
当然是！大获成功啦～～！！
My Opening for the party
没有人可以拒绝盲盒的魅力，尤其在我们的气氛组之下！
刚开始是载歌载舞后面直接群魔乱舞。
外国朋友去餐厅，也要晒Labubu～
连教授都来抽盲盒，第二天还跟我说： “My wife and kids are so happy, you made me a hero at home!” hhhh🤣
Party 从7点开始一直到快12点才结束，几乎整个cohort都来了，181个全世界的同学，来自47个国家（当中只有十几个华人）。
有乌克兰人、也有俄罗斯人……
无论战火或纷争，无论我们代表自己的国家、民族、企业还是自己。 也门、科威特、黎巴嫩、意大利、巴西、基督徒、穆斯林、印度教徒、共产主义者、资本主义者、男人、女人、第一代和第五代……就这样大家在一起唱《Can You Feel the Love Tonight》。
另一个有意思的细节为了给这个party上纲上线，我让AI写了一个Pop Mart的商业案例，在邀请教授们的时候也附上了，我还挺喜欢这个题目的
把搞事情的能力发挥到极致 hhh
以下为案例：
Pop Mart：如何把“惊喜”工业化——从北京小店到全球 Labubu 现象
开场引子：被低估的起点
2010 年，北京中关村欧美汇商场的一角，一间只有二三十平米的小文具杂货店开张。店主是 23 岁的王宁，一个刚从郑州大学西亚斯国际学院广告学毕业的河南青年。
他既没有常春藤名校的光环，也没有创投圈的人脉资源。大学四年，他过得普通，和大多数同学一样，最初的目标只是找份安稳的工作。但毕业后，他不甘心就此走向按部就班的人生，毅然拒绝广告公司的 offer，带着自己和家人凑齐的10 万元积蓄走上创业之路。
开店的头几个月，他每天守着货架，看着账本上每个月的营业额还不足0.43 万美元（约 4,100 美元），常常陷入沉思。他能想到的唯一目标是：“让店铺先活下去。”
谁也未曾料到，十五年后，这家小文具店会成长为市值约 490 亿美元 的潮玩巨头，在资本市场超越无数知名互联网公司。
第一章：三次试错——从卖货到寻找灵魂
第一次尝试：潮流文具
王宁最初定位为“潮流文具店”，货架上摆满了进口的韩国文具。他甚至亲自跑去香港，带回一些大陆市场没有的品牌，盼着能吸引学生和白领。
然而文具行业竞争激烈，毛利极低。他经常忙到深夜整理库存，第二天翻开账本才发现，卖出一堆文具，利润还不够支付水电和房租。
第二次尝试：进口玩具集合店
2013 年，他果断转型，把店改成“潮流玩具集合店”，卖日本扭蛋、美国手办、香港设计小玩偶。那段时间，店里确实热闹过一阵子，客人排队投币抽扭蛋机。
但好景不长：这些产品依赖进口，供货周期长、成本高。他常常熬夜跑机场提货，扛回几箱玩具，却发现同行立刻用更低价格跟卖。他的生意始终停留在“卖一批、缺一批、再找货”的循环里。利润率几乎被挤压殆尽。
挫败细节：最窘迫的时候，他不得不降价清货，店里打出“买二送一”的横幅，但顾客却越来越少。那段时间，他几乎要放弃，甚至考虑重新找一份工作。
第三次尝试：寻找“情绪共鸣”
失败中，王宁渐渐意识到：顾客真正需要的，并不是功能性的“笔记本”或“玩偶”，而是能激发情绪共鸣 的东西。
2015 年，他在香港国际玩具展遇见了 Kenny Wong 的“Molly”。那个湖蓝头发、眼神傲娇的小女孩，让他顿时明白了“情绪即价值”。
2016 年，泡泡玛特推出“盲盒 + IP” 模式。盲盒的随机性制造“惊喜”，Molly 的表情满足年轻人对“悦己消费”的渴望。Pop Mart 终于从“卖商品”迈入“经营情绪”的新阶段。
第二章：盲盒与情绪——模式的秘密
盲盒：概率即设计
每个盒子都藏着未知的款式，“隐藏款”和“限定款”让用户心跳加速。盲盒并不是赌博，而是“概率型体验设计”。核心用户年复购率超过 80%，平均每人每年买 12 个盲盒。
情绪：商品即社交货币
盲盒开箱逐渐成为社交话题。消费者买的不只是玩偶，而是一种“被理解的情绪”，是一种社交身份。
第三章：Labubu 的爆发——第二条增长曲线
2019 年，Pop Mart 与比利时插画家Kasing Lung 合作，把绘本角色 Labubu 引入市场。它长着尖牙、呆萌又叛逆，最初让不少人觉得“怪”。然而，年轻一代却从它的怪异中看到了自我投射。Labubu 很快出圈，成为“孤独经济”和“自我表达”的载体。业绩飞跃2025 年上半年，Pop Mart 总营收 约 19.4 亿美元；其中 The Monsters（含 Labubu）贡献约 6.7 亿美元，同比增长 668%。毛绒版本半年卖出 8.6 亿美元，占总营收 44.2%。毛利率高达 70.3%。文化时刻在洛杉矶，粉丝自发举办 “Labubu Rave”，把它当作夜店里的情绪符号。在纽约美网，大阪直美带着定制 Labubu 上场，引爆全球社媒。在北京永乐拍卖行，一只 131cm 的 Labubu 以 约 15 万美元成交，正式跨入艺术品领域。
Labubu 成为了 Molly 之后的“第二曲线”，撑起了 Pop Mart 的新增长引擎。
第四章：背后的聪明做法
RoboShop 自动贩卖机试水
Pop Mart 在开设门店前，常先投放 RoboShop 做市场测试。三天安装，实时收集数据，确认商圈潜力再重投。2025 年上半年 RoboShop 收入同比翻倍，还增加了“送货到家”。
全渠道触点密度
2024 年，Pop Mart 在中国有 401 家门店、2,300 台 RoboShop；海外 120 家门店、172 台 RoboShop。TikTok 海外收入同比增长 +5,779.8%。
2025 年，美洲门店增加到 41 家，线上收入同比增长 +1,977%。
合规即体验
中国要求禁止向 8 岁以下销售、必须披露概率与价值。王宁没有回避，而是把规则嵌入产品：半盲/明盒、会员保底。合规也成了用户体验的一部分。
自有 IP 高占比
2025 年上半年，约 99% 的营收来自自有 IP。
IP 可佩戴化
Labubu 被做成包挂件、饰品，成为随身的“社交符号”。
第五章：资本市场与不确定性市值新高：2025年8月，Pop Mart 市值约 490 亿美元。恒指纳入与股价回落：9月8日被纳入恒生指数，但当天股价却下跌 7–9%，投资者担忧单一 IP 依赖。在董事会上，王宁说：“把热度写进护城河。” 他的战略是：多 IP 矩阵、全球化扩张、以及合规创新。
启示与讨论
非精英创业者的突围
出身普通大学，没有资源，却能成功。关键在于对“情绪需求”的敏锐洞察。
模式创新的力量
Pop Mart 没有技术壁垒，却通过“IP + 盲盒 + 社交”重构了行业价值链。
长期主义的坚持
在流量为王的时代，王宁拒绝低价促销，坚持长期体验。最终赢得全球信任。
结语
Labubu 的故事，是一个普通大学毕业生如何把“惊喜”做成组织能力的案例。
从一个月营收不足0.43 万美元的小店，到半年贡献 6.7 亿美元的全球 IP。
Pop Mart 证明了：在消费的时代，精准捕捉用户的情绪缺口，配合极致执行力，能让一个平凡的创业者搭建起属于自己的商业帝国。
From a Corner Shop in Beijing to the Global Labubu Phenomenon
Opening Hook: An Underrated Beginning
In 2010, in a quiet corner of the Europlaza Mall in Beijing’s Zhongguancun district, a 23-year-old named Wang Ningstood behind the counter of a tiny stationery shop called Pop Mart.
Wang was not a typical “star entrepreneur.” He was a graduate of Zhengzhou University’s Sias International College with a degree in advertising—a provincial school, far from Ivy League prestige. He had no venture-capital contacts, no wealthy patrons. He had scraped together about $14,000 (100,000 RMB) in savings, partly from family support, and poured it into this first venture.
The numbers were grim. Monthly revenue was barely $4,100, hardly enough to cover rent and utilities. Wang’s only goal at that time was simple: “Keep the shop alive.”
Fifteen years later, this same shop would grow into Pop Mart, a designer-toy giant with a market capitalization of nearly $49 billion—surpassing many Chinese internet heavyweights.
Chapter 1: Three Failed Attempts—From Selling Goods to Searching for a SoulFirst Attempt: Trendy Stationery
At the beginning, Wang stocked Korean stationery—colorful notebooks, pens, quirky bookmarks. He hoped to attract students and young professionals. But the stationery business was brutally competitive, margins razor-thin, and differentiation almost impossible.
Failure detail: He often worked late into the night counting unsold pens and folders, realizing he was making almost no profit even after long days.Second Attempt: Import Toy Collection Store (2013)
By 2013, Wang pivoted. He transformed the store into a “trend toy collection shop,” importing Japanese capsule toys and American figurines. For a while, it drew curious young customers; lines even formed around new gachapon machines.
But it wasn’t sustainable. Supply was unstable, margins were crushed. He would personally haul boxes from the airport, only to discover competitors selling the same toys at lower prices the next week.
Failure detail: At one point, he resorted to “buy two, get one free” clearance banners to move inventory. Sales still fell, and customers stopped coming. He nearly gave up and considered finding a salaried job.Third Attempt: Discovering Emotional Resonance
Repeated setbacks led to reflection. Why were customers willing to buy certain toys again and again? Wang realized the answer wasn’t functionality—it was emotion.
At the Hong Kong Toy Fair in 2015, he encountered artist Kenny Wong’s Molly. With her turquoise hair and sulky expression, Molly had no backstory, but she radiated emotional character. Wang instantly saw its potential.
In 2016, Pop Mart launched the “Blind Box + IP” model. Blind boxes provided surprise; IP characters provided emotional resonance. It marked Pop Mart’s transformation from selling products to managing emotions.
Chapter 2: Blind Boxes and Emotion—The Secret of the Model
Blind Boxes: Probability as Design
Each purchase was a moment of suspense—would you get the common figure or the secret rare? Scarcity and exclusivity fueled repeat buying. This was not gambling, but probability-based experience design. Core users showed over 80% annual repurchase rates, averaging 12 blind boxes per year.
Emotion: Toys as Social Currency
Opening blind boxes became a social ritual. People collected, traded, and posted their finds. They weren’t just buying figurines; they were buying the feeling of being understood and belonging to a community.
Chapter 3: Labubu’s Breakout—The Second Growth Curve
In 2019, Pop Mart partnered with Belgian-born illustrator Kasing Lung to commercialize Labubu, a mischievous monster with spiky ears and sharp teeth. Initially “too weird” for some, Labubu soon resonated with younger consumers seeking self-expression and a quirky antidote to loneliness.Business Impact: By the first half of 2025, Pop Mart’s revenue reached $1.94 billion. The Monsters series (including Labubu) contributed $670 million, up +668% YoY. Plush Labubu alone added $860 million, 44.2% of total sales. Gross margin soared to 70.3%.Cultural Moments:In Los Angeles, fans organized a “Labubu Rave,” dancing with plush Labubus like emotional totems.In New York, Naomi Osaka brought custom Labubus courtside at the US Open, igniting global media buzz.In Beijing, a 131-cm Labubu sold for $150,000 at Yongle Auction, cementing its place in art collecting.
Labubu became Pop Mart’s “second curve,” following Molly, and proved the model’s scalability.
Chapter 4: Smart Moves Behind the Success
RoboShop Market Testing
Before opening costly stores, Pop Mart tested demand by installing vending-machine-style RoboShops. Installation took three days, and sales data guided location strategy. In 1H 2025, RoboShop revenue doubled, and “home delivery” was added.
Omnichannel Density
By 2024: 401 stores and 2,300 RoboShops in China; 120 stores and 172 RoboShops overseas. Overseas TikTok revenue jumped +5,779.8%. By 2025, the Americas had 41 stores, with online revenue up +1,977%.
Compliance as Experience
Regulators required bans on under-8 sales and transparent odds disclosure. Pop Mart embedded compliance into design—semi-blind boxes, guaranteed pulls for members—turning rules into part of the delight.
Proprietary IP Share
In 1H 2025, about 99% of revenue came from proprietary IP, ensuring bargaining power and margins.
Wearable IP
Labubu charms and accessories made the IP visible on the street, magnifying organic reach and social sharing.
Chapter 5: Capital Markets and UncertaintyMarket Cap High: By August 2025, Pop Mart’s market cap was about $49 billion.Hang Seng Inclusion & Stock Dip: On September 8, Pop Mart joined the Hang Seng Index. Shares promptly fell 7–9% as investors worried about over-reliance on Labubu’s hype.
At a board meeting, Wang Ning remarked:
“We must turn heat into a moat.”
His strategy: diversify IPs, globalize distribution, and innovate compliance-based design.
Lessons and Discussion
The Underdog Entrepreneur
From an ordinary provincial university, with no elite resources, Wang proved success comes from sharp cultural insight.
Power of Model Innovation
Pop Mart didn’t rely on cutting-edge tech, but reinvented the toy industry with IP + blind box + social sharing.
Long-Term Discipline
While livestreaming and discount wars boomed, Wang resisted short-term temptations. He focused on experience, earning trust and long-term growth.
Conclusion
Labubu’s story is the story of Wang Ning’s hero’s journey. From a struggling shop making less than $4,100 a month, to a single IP contributing $670 million in half a year, Pop Mart shows how industrialized surprise—when combined with emotional insight and operational discipline—can transform an ordinary entrepreneur into the builder of a global empire.
以上内容，仅供娱乐。如有错误，纯属AI的锅！
最后，Cohort做了一个Labubu sticker～
印度人说，自己的party也要好好搞！
这不就，卷起来了😁